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Abstract
 Th e article is about the dynamics between an international organization 
and the institutional actors vis-à-vis the policymaking process. It argues 
that the Anti–Money Laundering Law (AMLA) was exogenously driven, 
as the policy was instigated purely by external demand and enacted under 
external pressure. AMLA is considered an imposition of the Paris-based 
intergovernmental organization the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Th e 
swiftness of the enactment of AMLA exemplifi es the immense infl uence that an 
international fi nancial organization can have on the policy actors as well as on 
the policymaking process. Th e policymaking process in this type of institutional 
engagement—between institutional actors (executive and legislature) within 
a polity and an international organization—is effi  cient in producing a policy 
output. However, the process represents an issue of international override 
on a state, as a nonveto player dictates to the institutional veto players. Th is 
experience supports the global pattern that in issues associated with global 
fi nancial standards, policymaking will less be shaped by the institutional actors 
and will extensively be defi ned by international actors. Th e making of AMLA 
presents an archetype of how international organizations can hold sway over 
the state.
Keywords: Anti–Money Laundering Act; Financial Action Task Force; money 
laundering; veto players; international organization 
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DOF – Department of Finance
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ESAAMLG – Eastern and South Africa Anti–Money Laundering Group
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FSRBs – FATF-style regional bodies
GAFISUD – Grupo de Acción Financiera de Sudamérica (Financial Action 
Task Force on Money Laundering in South America)
GIABA – Groupe Intergouvernemental d’Action contre le Blanchiment 
d’Argent en Afrique de l’Ouest (Inter-Governmental Action Group 
against Money Laundering in West Africa)
HB – House Bill
IFI – international fi nancial institution
IMF – International Monetary Fund
MENAFATF – Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task 
Force 
MONEYVAL – Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money 
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
NBI – National Bureau of Investigation
OFW – overseas Filipino worker
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RA – Republic Act
SB – Senate Bill
SEC – Securities and Exchange Commission
NCCT – Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories
WB – World Bank
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Introduction
 Policymaking is not only about content but also process. In the past, 
the emphasis in the study of policy was always on content; as a consequence, 
the process in policymaking was invariably overlooked. Th is conception was 
underscored by the notion that success or failure was determined mainly by the 
substance of the policy. However, the development debacle of the postwar era, 
where generic policies prescribed by international fi nancial institutions (e.g., 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund) and adopted by third world 
countries led to diff erent outcomes, has cast doubt on the traditional thinking 
and put impetus on reassessment. A policy that works in one country may 
not work in another, or even in the same country at a diff erent time (Stein et 
al., ). Th e experience has led to a changed outlook and the rationale to 
focus on the process of policymaking. Indeed, the process can shape the policy 
outcome.
 In analyzing the process in policymaking, one needs to focus on the strategic 
engagement among the policy actors. In democracies, the central institutions 
are usually the executive and legislative branches. As their interaction and 
concurrence are necessary to produce policies, the two branches are considered 
veto players in the policymaking process. Another signifi cant policy actor is 
international institutions. As external entities working outside the territorial 
confi nes of a state, they are considered nonveto players in the conventional 
policymaking process. Recently, international institutions, using the aegis of 
a global standard, have intensifi ed their intrusion in the process. Th ey have 
taken the role of setting the legislative agenda and led the eff ort to ensure that 
countries legislate laws that conform to a global standard.
 Th is paper examines the infl uence of an international organization on the 
policymaking process of a polity. In particular, it will examine the enactment of 
the Anti–Money Laundering Act (AMLA) in relation to the interface between 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the institutional veto players of 
the policymaking process. Th e FATF set a global standard to combat money 
laundering, and the Philippine government was obliged to conform to that 
fi nancial standard. To comply, the government (the Arroyo administration 
and the Congress) needed to collaborate to pass a money laundering law. 
Noncompliance would lead to the imposition of sanctions. Th e paper argues 
that AMLA is a direct consequence of an external demand where a nonveto 
player overwhelms the veto players. AMLA is an imposition of the FATF, as the 
international organization shaped the policy process and outcome and prevailed 
over the institutional policy actors. 
 Th e paper is organized as follows. First, the framework of analysis is 
presented; second, the eff ect of economic globalization and the need for 
regulatory standards are explained; third, the FATF’s quest to establish a global 
standard on money laundering is traced and discussed; fourth, the steps and 
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politics behind the enactment of AMLA are identifi ed and examined; and, 
lastly, the dynamics of the interaction between the international organization 
and institutional actors in the policymaking process are elaborated.
Framework of Analysis
 Th e policymaking process is generally defi ned as the collective process of 
discussing, approving, and implementing public policy (Stein et al., ). 
Traditionally, policymaking is deemed as an endogenous process where 
solely the government exercises the prerogative of crafting policies within its 
territory. Usually, no other entity, whether in the domestic or international 
realm, can legitimately enact policies without going through the governmental 
policymaking process. In democracies, the typical institutional actors in 
the policymaking process are the executive and legislative branches of the 
government. Th e branches are central to policymaking, as both participate and 
control the process. In addition, the inputs of other political actors, whether 
internal (such as business groups, labor unions, the media, and other members 
of the civil society) or external (such as multinational corporations, international 
organizations, and foreign governments), are eventually manifested directly or 
indirectly in the executive-legislative engagement.
 One way of examining the intricacies of the policymaking dynamics is 
through the veto players’ theory. Th e theory contends that policies are produced 
when there is agreement among the veto players in a political system (Tsebelis, 
). A veto player is an individual or collective actor who, through their 
control of an offi  ce or branch of government, can reject any policy proposal 
(Haggard and McCubbins, ; Tsebelis, ). Veto players are usually 
specifi ed by the constitution. Th ey are deemed institutional political actors, 
whose agreement is necessary to enact policies. In the presidential system, the 
central institutional actors in the policymaking process are the president, the 
Senate, and the House of Representatives. In the enactment of policies, the 
unanimous decision of all three institutions of government is indispensable, as 
the dissent of one is enough to thwart the enactment of a policy. For instance, 
a policy proposed by the president and agreed to by the members of the House 
of Representatives will not materialize into a law if the senators will not concur 
with it. Th us, policy production in this institutional arrangement is basically 
defi ned by the consensus among the veto players. 
 Other actors that may aff ect the policymaking process are considered 
as nonveto players. Unlike the institutional veto players, neither the consent 
or dissent nor the participation of nonveto players is necessary to the formal 
policymaking process. Th ey are exogenous to the process, and their infl uence 
is always channeled through the veto players. Nonveto players could either be 
domestic or international actors. Th e former operate within and are subjected 
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to the authority of the state while the latter operate from the outside and are 
independent of the authority of the state. 
  One of the more active nonveto players in contemporary policymaking 
is international organizations. Although they are external entities, they have 
emerged as powerful actors in the process as they increasingly shape policy 
outcome. Th eir infl uence is strongest in policy areas with international character 
and implications (Howlett and Ramesh, ). One area where this trend 
is evident is in fi nance, particularly in the eff orts of international fi nancial 
organizations to set global standards to which sovereign states are obliged 
to conform by enacting specifi c policies. As fi nancial organizations demand 
that governments comply with these standards, sustained pressure is applied 
to the institutional actors as well as to the policymaking process, in eff ect 
making noncompliance politically and economically costly. In this practice, 
international organizations acquire enormous leverage to set the agenda and 
defi ne the particular policy output. Th e policymaking process under this 
arrangement—between institutional actors within a polity and international 
fi nancial organizations—though eff ective in producing policies, ramifi es into 
an issue of international override on a state. Th e engagement results in an 
asymmetrical relationship where the nonveto player dictates to the institutional 
veto players. As a consequence, the process becomes primarily externally driven 
as policymaking will less be shaped by the institutional actors within the state 
and will be extensively determined by international actors.
 Th e study looks into the infl uence of an international organization on 
the institutional actors in the policymaking process using the veto players’ 
framework. Th e focus is on the interface of the FATF and the executive and 
legislative branches of the Philippine government in the enactment of the 
fi nancial regulation policy, Republic Act  or the Anti–Money Laundering 
Act and its amendment, RA . Th e engagement of the policy actors in the 
policymaking process is examined to determine how a nonveto player dominated 
the veto players performing their institutional role.
Economic Globalization and the Need 
for Regulatory Standards 
As a consequence of technological advances and government deregulation 
policies, economic globalization is usually seen in terms of the intensifi cation 
of the movement of trade, fi nance, labor, and information across state borders 
(O’Brien, ; Ohmae, ). In the fi nancial realm, this phenomenon 
leads to greater interconnectedness and integration of fi nancial markets, where 
capital and funds are mobile and fi nancial transactions relatively easy. “With 
transactions able to be conducted in a few seconds, vast amounts of capital 
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could be shipped around the globe, in and out of national economies, at the 
behest of those who worked in the markets” (Gill, ). 
With the unprecedented global fi nancial mobility, issues have emerged 
that demand coordination among states to manage the volatility of the 
fi nancial markets. Th e wave of fi nancial crises in the s (Latin America in 
, Asia in , Russia in , and Brazil in ) as well as the current 
global economic recession that started in the United States, for instance, has 
underscored the susceptibility of the global fi nancial system to downturns. 
Financial crisis in one area, whether a state or a region, cannot anymore be 
contained in isolation, as the interconnectedness of economies makes the crisis 
contagious, easily spilling over to other areas. 
Moreover, fi nancial mobility has resulted in the tremendous growth of 
transborder deposits, loans, branch networks, and fund transfers and has 
reshaped the banking system (Scholte, ). Although this development 
remarkably enhances the effi  ciency of the banking sector, it has its downside, 
particularly with regard to the problem of organized crime and terrorism. 
Nowadays, funding and fund transfers for organized criminal syndicates and 
international terrorist groups have become readily obtainable and accessible. 
Th e International Monetary Fund (IMF) in  estimated that the aggregate 
size of money laundering in the world could be around – of the global 
gross domestic product (FSA, ). Here, the IMF () defi nes money 
laundering as “a process in which the illicit source of assets obtained or generated 
by criminal activity is concealed to obscure the link between the funds and 
the original criminal activity.” Th is concern has called for controls over the 
global movement of fi nance, specifi cally the necessity to restrict the fl ow and 
use of money by illicit groups. In constraining the fi nances of these groups, “it 
became necessary to cooperate with others on tightening fi nancial controls, not 
only to prevent money laundering and possible disruption to the international 
fi nancial order, but also to stop the fl ow of funds to [criminal and] terrorist 
organizations” (Yahuda, ). 
Managing the vulnerability of the global fi nancial system as well as 
precluding the transmission and utilization of illegitimate money entails that 
states put up fi nancial regulations. To ensure their harmony and eff ectiveness, 
these regulations need to adhere to global standards. Th e dissemination of 
fi nancial regulations has generally been assumed by international fi nancial 
organizations, which have assumed the responsibility of persuading states to 
comply with global regulatory standards.
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Financial Action Task Force1 and Its Global 
Financial Standard
 One leading international organization that promotes fi nancial regulations 
to ensure the integrity of the global fi nancial system is the FATF. Th e FATF is 
the product of the eff orts of leading developed states in the s to specifi cally 
combat the worldwide problem of money laundering. As a direct response 
to the problem, the FATF was formally established in  during the G- 
Summit in Paris. Th e core membership came from the G- member states, the 
European Commission, and eight other countries. Th e organization does not 
have a tightly defi ned constitution or an unlimited life span. Since its inception, 
the FATF reviews its mission every fi ve years and operates, requiring a specifi c 
decision among the members to continue. In , the ministry representatives 
of FATF agreed to extend the term of the organization until .
 At fi rst, the mandate of the FATF was to cope mainly with the proliferation 
of illicit money, particularly the worldwide fl ow of drug money into banks and 
other fi nancial institutions. As a consequence of the / terrorist attack against 
the United States, the mandate, however, was broadened. Th us, in October 
, the mandate added terrorist fi nancing to money laundering. Accordingly, 
the original mandate and the extension are evident in the offi  cial description of 
the organization: “Th e FATF is an intergovernmental body whose purpose is 
to develop and promote policies, both at national and international levels, to 
combat money laundering and terrorist fi nancing” (FATF-GAFI, a). Th e 
FATF therefore functions as a quasi policymaking body, which works to generate 
the necessary political will to persuade national legislatures to bring about 
such policies. Th e FATF has three principal activities: fi rst, it sets international 
standards to combat money laundering and terrorist fi nancing; second, it 
ensures eff ective compliance with FATF standards; and third, it reviews money 
laundering and terrorist fi nancing techniques and countermeasures (FATF-
GAFI, b).
 In setting standards, the FATF has instituted the Forty Recommendations 
and the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (the so-called 
 +  Recommendations) as the basic framework—a comprehensive plan of 
action needed to combat money laundering and terrorist fi nancing. Th e Forty 
Recommendations (which were originally issued in  and later revised in 
 and in ) principally call for the criminalization of money laundering 
(FATF-GAFI, b). On the other hand, the Nine Recommendations (eight 
were initially issued in  and an additional recommendation was added 
in ) mainly call for the criminalization of the fi nancing of terrorism 
(FATF-GAFI, a). Th e  +  Recommendations, require the enactment 
of specifi c laws that would make both money laundering and fi nancing of 
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terrorism a serious crime. Th e recommendations are intended to be of universal 
application. Th e FATF seeks the adoption by and compliance of members as 
well as nonmembers and makes the  +  Recommendations the globally 
recognized international standards for anti–money laundering and combating 
the fi nancing of terrorism (AML/CFT).
 Complying with the FATF standards means that countries must enact 
anti–money laundering laws and measures that conform to the  +  
Recommendations and guarantee the eff ective application of such regulations. 
To ensure global adherence, the FATF monitors the progress of legislation in 
passing the necessary laws in each country and evaluates its implementation. 
Laws must not only be passed; there must also be full and proper enforcement 
and an eff ective system for doing so. Th us, criminalizing money laundering and 
terrorist fi nancing must be accompanied by properly trained law enforcement 
and prosecutorial authorities that are equipped with suffi  cient powers and 
resources (FATF-GAFI, b).
 Countries are assessed through the mutual evaluation process, a critical 
mechanism that is considered a central pillar of the activity of the FATF (FATF-
GAFI, b). Th e process is deemed as peer review where the evaluations are 
based on  +  Recommendations and use the AML/CFT Methodology . 
Th e evaluation is conducted by a team of experts from the legal, fi nancial, and 
law enforcement areas and the FATF secretariat through an on-site visit to a 
country where the assessors engage in comprehensive meetings with government 
offi  cials and the private sector. To ensure fair and consistent evaluations, the 
FATF has developed thorough and detailed instructions and procedures for 
conducting mutual evaluations. Th e procedures are laid out in the AML/CFT 
Evaluations and Assessments’ Handbook for Countries and Assessors. Th e 
results of the evaluations are compiled in a Mutual Evaluation Report, which 
provides comprehensive information on the status of each country in relation 
to the actions taken to combat money laundering and terrorist fi nancing. 
 Th e current membership of the FATF has only  countries. To have a 
global reach, the FATF operates in collaboration with FATF-style regional bodies 
(FSRBs), thus creating a network of more than  countries. Th e FSRBs are 
regional organizations that are deemed committed to implement the  +  
Recommendations in their respective areas and have agreed to undergo the 
mutual evaluation process (FATF-GAFI, a). In performing its mandate, 
the FATF works closely in partnership with FSRBs; at the moment, there are 
eight FSRBs, fi ve of which were given associate member status in the FATF. As 
part of FATF’s call for all countries, including nonmembers, to implement the 
FATF recommendations, countries that are not members are encouraged to join 
the FSRB in their region (FATF-GAFI, b). In promoting the AML/CFT 
regime, the FATF also collaborates with other international organizations, 
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particularly, the international fi nancial institutions (IFIs). Notable IFIs are the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSB), and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units 
(EGFIU). 
 To ensure that the mutual evaluations process is eff ective and that 
countries cooperate and adopt the AML/CFT standard, the FATF utilizes the 
Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) initiative. Th e NCCT 
is basically a list of countries and territories that are identifi ed as lacking in 
compliance or are noncompliant. In the assessments, the FATF uses the List 
of Criteria for Defi ning Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories. Th e list 
is made up of  criteria that identify detrimental rules and practices that 
hinder international cooperation in combating money laundering. Th e criteria 
are classifi ed into four categories: () loopholes in fi nancial regulations, () 
obstacles raised by other regulatory requirements, () obstacles to international 
cooperation, and () inadequate resources for preventing and detecting money 
laundering activities (FATF-GAFI, a). Since the inception of the NCCT 
initiative in ,  countries have undergone the NCCT assessment. A total of 
 countries were identifi ed as NCCTs:  in  (including the Philippines) 
and  in  (FATF-GAFI, a).
 Unless the country identifi ed as NCCT takes the necessary actions to 
address the defi ciencies so as to adequately conform to the FATF standards, 
the country is susceptible to the imposition of countermeasures by the FATF. 
Th e basic measure against NCCTs is the application of Recommendation  
and :
. Financial institutions should give special attention to business 
relationships and transactions with persons, including companies and 
fi nancial institutions, from countries which do not or insuffi  ciently 
apply the FATF Recommendations. Whenever these transactions have 
no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and 
purpose should, as far as possible, be examined, the fi ndings established 
in writing, and be available to help competent authorities. Where such 
a country continues not to apply or insuffi  ciently applies the FATF 
Recommendations, countries should be able to apply appropriate 
countermeasures.
. Financial institutions should ensure that the principles applicable to 
fi nancial institutions, which are mentioned above are also applied 
to branches and majority owned subsidiaries located abroad, 
especially in countries which do not or insuffi  ciently apply the FATF 
Recommendations, to the extent that local applicable laws and 
regulations permit. When local applicable laws and regulations prohibit 
this implementation, competent authorities in the country of the parent 
institution should be informed by the fi nancial institutions that they 
cannot apply the FATF Recommendations (FATF-GAFI, b).
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  Moreover, in cases where the NCCTs fail to show adequate progress in 
addressing the defi ciencies, the FATF can impose further countermeasures such 
as the following:
. Stringent requirements for identifying clients and enhancing advisories 
(including jurisdiction-specific financial advisories) to financial 
institutions for identifi cation of the benefi cial owners before business 
relationships are established with individuals or companies from these 
countries;
. Enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of 
fi nancial transactions on the basis that fi nancial transactions with such 
countries are more likely to be suspicious;
. Taking into account the fact that the relevant bank is from an NCCT, 
when considering requests for approving the establishment in FATF 
member countries of subsidiaries or branches or representative offi  ces 
of banks;
. Warning nonfi nancial sector businesses that conducting transactions 
with entities within the NCCTs might run the risk of money laundering 
(FATF-GAFI, a).
 For countries to be removed from the list of NCCTs, they need to take 
the necessary steps for delisting. Th e steps deal with what precisely should be 
required by way of implementing legislative and regulatory reforms made by 
NCCTs to respond to the defi ciencies identifi ed by the FATF. Th e essential 
initial steps in delisting are the following:
. An NCCT must enact laws and promulgate regulations that comply 
with international standards to address the defi ciencies identifi ed by the 
NCCT report that formed the basis of the FATF’s decision to place the 
jurisdiction on the NCCT list in the fi rst instance.
. Th e NCCTs that have made substantial reform in their legislation should 
be requested to submit to the FATF, through the applicable regional 
review group, an implementation plan with targets, milestones, and 
time frames that will ensure eff ective implementation of the legislative 
and regulatory reforms. Th e NCCT should be asked particularly to 
address the following important determinants in the FATF’s judgment 
as to whether it can be delisted: fi ling of suspicious activity reports, 
analysis and follow-up of reports, the conduct of money laundering 
investigations, examination of financial institutions (particularly 
with respect to customer identifi cation), international exchange of 
information, and the provision of budgetary and human resources 
(FATF-GAFI, a).
 As one of the countries identifi ed as NCCT in , the Philippines 
was expected to conform to the  +  standard of the FATF by legislating an 
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anti–money laundering law. As the FATF observed in its June  Report on 
Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories:
. Th e Philippines meets criteria , , , , , , , , , , , , , 
,  and .Th e country lacks a basic set of anti–money laundering 
regulations such as customer identifi cation and record keeping. Bank 
records have been under excessive secrecy provisions. Th e country does 
not have any specifi c legislation to criminalize money laundering per 
se. Furthermore, a system for reporting suspicious transactions does not 
exist in the country.
. During the past few years, the government has been unsuccessful in 
having Congress to pass several anti–money laundering bills. Th e 
Government of the Philippines urgently needs to enact an anti–money 
laundering bill during the current session of the Congress (June  
to May ), to criminalize money laundering, require customer 
identifi cation as well as record keeping, introduce suspicious transaction 
reporting system and relax the bank secrecy provisions (FATF-GAFI, 
).
 As a consequence of being blacklisted, the Philippines was subjected 
to routine countermeasures, following Recommendations  and . Th e 
countermeasures implied that fi nancial transactions involving the country 
would be stringently scrutinized and examined to ensure their lawfulness. Th e 
FATF gave the Philippines up to  September  to comply and pass the 
anti–money laundering law. Failure to pass the law before the deadline meant 
that the country would face more severe and additional countermeasures.
Th e Politics of the Anti–Money Laundering Act 
Political Inertia among Veto Players
 Even before it was prodded by the FATF, the Philippines had shown its 
commitment to enact the AMLA when the government became a signatory 
to three international accords—the  Vienna Convention against Illicit 
Traffi  c in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance, the  United Nations 
Political Declaration and Action Plan against Money Laundering, and the 
 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. As 
a signatory to those multilateral agreements, the government was mandated to 
enact an anti–money laundering law. Congress over the years had been trying to 
enact the law. For instance, in the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses, Congressman 
Raul Gonzales fi led the so-called Rico bill; it was approved in the House but 
did not prosper in the Senate. Th e anti–money laundering bill fi led by the late 
Senator Robert Barbers in the Senate did not prosper beyond the committee 
level. Th e failure of the legislature to take decisive action, despite the existence 
2010 © University of the Philippines Mindanao
51BRILLO | BANWA VOL. 7, NO. 1 (2010): 40–68
of a political obligation due to the international agreements, seems to suggest 
that the legislators saw no urgency in having an anti–money laundering law. 
Th e legislative body was lukewarm because the mandate obligates, but does 
not penalize noncompliance. Th us, there was little incentive for the legislators 
to prioritize the law over other bills.
 Th e attitude of the legislators was shared by the executive branch. Th e 
Aquino, Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo administrations were apparently half-
hearted in pushing the law. No defi nite advisory came from the Offi  ce of 
the President declaring the urgency of such a measure. Th e Department of 
Foreign Aff airs (DFA), which handles the correspondence of the government 
with international organizations, appeared not to see the necessity, as it did 
not bother to inform Congress of the discussions with the FATF. Furthermore, 
before the Eleventh Congress adjourned sine die, it had a special session, but 
its agenda did not include the anti–money laundering bill. Two bank-related 
laws—the revision of the General Banking Act and the amendments to the 
Bangko Sentral Act—were acted upon, yet the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 
(BSP) never brought up the concern of the FATF.
 Th e initial eff ort to enact an anti–money laundering law began only when 
President Arroyo made a commitment to the FATF in May  that she 
would certify to the newly elected Twelfth Congress the urgency of passing the 
said law (FATF-GAFI, ). Th e formal eff orts commenced in the executive 
department when the Inter-agency Committee composed of the Department 
of Justice (DOJ), Department of Finance (DOF), Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and the BSP was formed. Th e Inter-agency Committee 
conducted preliminary hearings where key stakeholders (such as the Banking 
Association of the Philippines [BAP], enforcers such as the National Bureau of 
Investigation [NBI], the Philippine National Police [PNP], and legal experts 
from the University of the Philippines Law Center) were invited. Th e hearings 
resulted in the executive version of the anti–money laundering law. As chairman 
of the Inter-agency Committee, Justice Undersecretary Jose Calida asserted that 
the draft was not only a product of careful deliberations and consultations with 
the stakeholders, but it was also patterned after the anti–money laundering laws 
of other countries. 
 According to BSP Governor Rafael Buenaventura, the anti–money 
laundering law must address fi ve principal criteria to comply with the standards 
set by the FATF. First, make money laundering activity a criminal off ence that 
will make it a crime per se. Second, a reporting system must be put in place 
so that covered individuals or institutions are required to make reports on 
unusual transactions. Th ird, an implementing agency must be created. Fourth, 
an exception must be made to the Bank Deposit Secrecy Law (Republic Act 
), which makes it diffi  cult to look into suspicious accounts (as the  
Banko Sentral Act removed from the Monetary Board the authority to look 
into suspicious account without a court order or a waiver from the depositor). 
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Fifth, there must be a commitment to provide for international cooperation, 
particularly reciprocal exchange of information with foreign countries and 
institutions.
 Th e formal eff orts in the legislative branch commenced when the Senate 
and the House of Representatives conducted parallel committee hearings. In 
the House, the hearings were handled jointly by the Committee on Banks and 
Financial Intermediaries as the lead committee, headed by Congressman Jaime 
Lopez, and the Committee on Justice and the Committee on Economic Aff airs. 
In the Senate, the hearings were conducted jointly by the Committee on Banks, 
Financial Institutions, and Currencies, chaired by Senator Ramon Magsaysay, 
and the Committee on Justice and Human Rights, chaired by Senator Francis 
Pangilinan. Th e hearings commenced on  August in the House and on  
August in the Senate,  and  days, respectively, before the  September 
 deadline of the FATF.
 At the onset of the committee hearings, both chambers faced the diffi  cult 
task of consolidating the multitude of bills fi led before the approaching 
deadline— Senate Bills (i.e., SB , , , , , , , , 
, , and ), and  House Bills (i.e., HB , , , , , 
, , , and ). Th e task was made harder by the fact that enacting 
the law was deemed to touch on delicate matters such as the Bank Secrecy Law, 
which was considered sacrosanct in the Philippine fi nancial system. To further 
complicate matters, Congress was scheduled to adjourn on September  and 
resume only on September , which would mean that the body had barely 
two weeks left to pass the law. With those concerns, the preliminary consensus 
among members of the Senate and House committees was that passing the law 
within the time frame was highly doubtful. Experience told them that enacting 
a highly complex and controversial law like the AMLA would take a longer time 
since that type of law usually goes through a lot of scrutiny and objections in 
Congress. 
 Moreover, the rejection of the plea of the Philippine government for 
extension of the FATF deadline further complicated the undertaking. Justice 
Undersecretary Calida informed the lawmakers that in the th Asia Pacifi c 
Group on Money Laundering (APG) meeting held on – May , the 
Philippine delegates hand-carried a letter by President Gloria Arroyo to FATF 
President Jose Roldan. Citing the eff orts taken by the government, such as 
administrative measures against money laundering put in place by the BSP, 
the letter specifi cally asked for leniency on the deadline. Another is the plea 
for extension made by Governor Buenaventura and Finance Secretary Isidro 
Camacho in their Tokyo meeting with the FATF. On both occasions, the FATF 
responded that although they sympathized with the Philippines, the demand 
for criminalizing money laundering is nonnegotiable. As aptly stated by 
Justice Undersecretary Calida, “unless we have that law [AMLA] no amount of 
pleading, or appeal for sympathy or leniency will get us out from the [NCCT] 
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list.” Th us, the unambiguous message is the Philippines either has it on time 
or face the countermeasures.
 To deal with the situation, members of the committees of both chambers 
were advised that, if need be, they would have to work every day to meet the 
deadline. Th e advisory included the forming of a technical group that would 
work on the draft bill during the scheduled congressional recess. Another 
time-saving move was the motion in both the Senate and House committees 
to adopt the executive interagency draft of the anti–money laundering law as 
the main template in consolidating the bills. Th e motion was made to expedite 
the lawmaking process and to ensure that the versions of both chambers would 
be as close to each other as possible. 
 Although the legislators recognized the importance of having a policy 
for addressing the problem of money laundering, most of them believed that 
crafting the law must not be imposed on them and that the process must 
be based on their own pace, not on an externally prescribed deadline. Th is 
sentiment is obvious from the comments of lawmakers in the deliberations. 
For instance, Congressman Lopez stated, “We don’t feel that we are bound 
by whatever the FATF decides . . . we are not even a part of it, and so we 
don’t feel that we should be forced to rush the approval of this bill.” Another, 
Congressman Marcelino Libanan, the chairman of the House Committee 
on Justice, warned that as a lot of provisions might confl ict with basic rights 
such as the constitutional rule on double jeopardy and the issue on the right 
to privacy, there was a need to take time in passing the law. Senator Edgardo 
Angara manifested that he would not “draw up and craft a bill that will make 
them [FATF] happy,” instead, he would “try to draw up or draft a bill that will 
suit our unique culture and customs.” 
 Adding confusion to the committee hearings of both chambers was the view 
espoused by the DFA vis-à-vis the deadline, which opposed the position of the 
DOJ, DOF, and BSP. Th e DFA, represented by Assistant Secretary Rosalinda 
Tirona, was the lead agency that handled the correspondence of FATF with the 
country prior to March . Th e DFA argued that there was no legal basis 
for the FATF September  deadline. With this opinion, she urged Congress 
to follow instead the  deadline set by the  United Nations Political 
Declaration against Money Laundering. However, the DOJ, DOF, and BSP 
maintained that Congress should follow the FATF deadline. Th e split in the 
position of the executive agencies was resolved when President Arroyo replaced 
Assistant Secretary Tirona with Finance Secretary Camacho as the lead offi  cial 
of the executive department in dealing with the FATF. Th at signifi ed the 
bonafi de position of the executive department. Moreover, the seemingly lack of 
consensus among the government agencies was also manifested when the BSP 
complained at the committee hearings that the DFA did not inform the BSP 
of the correspondence with the FATF. As BSP Governor Buenaventura pointed 
out, there had been no advance warning at all, and it was not until June  
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when the NCCT list came out that the BSP became aware of the situation. 
Th e governor also said that he took over in July , and his predecessor, 
Governor Gabriel Singson, confi rmed that the BSP was not aware of the FATF 
demand. 
Deadline, Blacklist, and Countermeasures 
 Th e posturing among lawmakers against the FATF demand weakened 
when they became cognizant of the implications of the NCCT list as well as 
the possible additional countermeasures if the law was not passed before the 
deadline. Being in the NCCT list meant that fi nancial transactions involving 
the Philippines would be examined more closely by the international fi nancial 
community. Th e lack of an anti–money laundering law would mean that 
fi nancial transactions relating to the country would be deemed suspicious. Other 
countries, particularly the FATF members, in turn, would inquire, investigate, 
and verify transactions emanating from the Philippines. Th ose actions would 
result in delays and additional costs. 
 Th e apprehensions about the countermeasures as well as the additional 
countermeasures were unambiguously stressed to the lawmakers, as the executive 
offi  cials consistently underscored the “chorus” of threats. For instance, Finance 
Secretary Camacho said, “Th e sanctions that we can expect are things that 
could impede our transactions, private sector transactions between our country 
and other countries which over time if it were to be maintained, could make 
us uncompetitive either as an exporter or importer of trade and services.” 
In addition, Justice Undersecretary Calida cautioned the lawmakers, “If we 
don’t want to listen to FATF, fi ne, but let’s be prepared for the additional 
countermeasures.” According to him, the additional countermeasures could 
be, fi rst, enhanced surveillance of all transactions; second, more stringent 
requirements for identifying clients; third, intensifi ed advisories to fi nancial 
institutions to conduct strict identifi cation of benefi cial owners; fourth, more 
systematic reporting of all fi nancial transactions; and fi fth, a warning to the 
international business community who might want to put up business in the 
Philippines. He estimated that the transaction cost due to delays per day can 
reach P million in imports, P million in exports, P million in tourism, 
and around $ billion of OFW remittances. BSP Governor Buenaventura 
reported that a “particular correspondent bank has already requested that 
their banking correspondence here request for waiver of secrecy of deposits on 
any transactions they have before they handle the transactions . . . In eff ect, 
normal transactions that normally will just go through the normal business of 
remitting in and out are now being required to give more information on who 
is the remitter, the source of the remittance.” Th e governor further warned that 
it would be very inconvenient and costly for everyone, as legitimate business 
transactions would be subjected to more rigid scrutiny so that ordinary 
transactions that normally fl ow in and fl ow out will be subjected to fl agging, 
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and more strict verifi cation would be required on deposit accounts, remittances, 
import and export trade, and issuance of visas. Th ese actions would consequently 
result in signifi cant delay as well as substantial increase in the cost of fi nancial 
transactions. International fi nancial transactions of local banks and other 
fi nancial institutions, which run into hundreds of million pesos a day, would 
no longer be automatically done. Instead, the requirements for fl agging would 
force them to handle the transactions manually. Th is condition over time would 
make the Philippines uncompetitive and unattractive to investors. 
 Th is “chorus” of threats that the executive offi  cials repeatedly aired in 
Congress profoundly shaped the mind-set of the lawmakers and the atmosphere 
of the deliberations. For instance, Congressman Lopez, stressing the aim of 
Congress, cautioned, “It will be useless for us to pass a law that will not be 
acceptable to the FATF . . . Our main objective here, I would like to emphasize, 
is for us to be delisted from the blacklist of the FATF so that we can have a 
reputation for integrity, that we are complying with the international standards.” 
Another lawmaker, Congressman Felix Alfelor, warned the body, “We should 
take heed of the fact that if we are not able to pass this law before September 
, there is a lot of sanction, economic sanctions which will be imposed on 
us, and a lot of these sanctions will be befalling our banks because a lot of the 
transactions that will be transacted by our banks with foreign clienteles will be 
prejudiced.” Senator Magsaysay, in a foreword to the Senate committee hearing, 
stated, “Th e signifi cance of the anti–money laundering legislation lies in the 
fact that the Philippines will remain in the blacklist of the FATF—Financial 
Action Task Force—and all our fi nancial transactions will be closely scrutinized, 
making it diffi  cult for the country to attract investments, business, and trade.” 
Adding pressure, the BAP, which was deemed the foremost industry that would 
be aff ected, fully supported the enactment of the anti–money laundering law. 
Th e bankers strongly lobbied the lawmakers, citing that the banking system 
faces not only increased transaction costs but also a serious reputational risk if 
the law is not passed. For instance, Mr. Leonilo Coronel, the executive director 
of BAP, informed the lawmakers that with the nonpassage of the AMLA, 
countermeasures may take the form of a particular requirement, such as the 
foreign fi nancial community requiring customers from the Philippines to waive 
the bank secrecy law, or a more extensive requirement, such as limiting of foreign 
investments and downgrading of credit ratings. He also warned of the possibility 
that the Philippine banking system might be isolated, thereby making it very 
diffi  cult to transact business with the international community.
 Stressing the urgency of enacting the anti–money laundering law before 
the FATF deadline, Finance Secretary Camacho warned that passing the law 
on September  or on October  would make a world of diff erence. Passing 
the law a day after the deadline could mean that countermeasures had already 
been set in motion. For the countermeasures to be lifted, the Philippines would 
have to undergo a review process that could take several months as all major 
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FATF decisions that aff ect countries are taken in the plenary. Th us, missing 
the deadline by just a single day means the country will be burdened by the 
countermeasures until they are lifted.
 Other powerful interest groups, such as the Overseas Filipino Workers 
(OFW), Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, and the Makati Business Club 
also intensifi ed the pressure on the lawmakers by consistently feeding media 
with press releases and newspaper advertisements in support of the immediate 
enactment of the anti–money laundering law throughout the process. Th e news 
articles, columns, and advertisements served as a propaganda tool that painted 
the lawmakers as sluggish in performing their function and hinted that their 
dillydallying put the entire country at risk of sanctions. Moreover, amid fears 
that the FATF sanctions would hit the OFWs the hardest, unconventional 
tactics were also employed. According to Executive Director Noel Josue, the 
members of Kaibigan ng OFWs (Kaibigan), other OFW groups here and 
overseas bombarded the mobile phones and Web sites of each opposing senator 
and his staff  with hate messages daily. Th e messages included warnings that the 
OFW groups would remember the names of the senators and that OFWs and 
their families would not vote for them in the elections (Nocum and Contreras, 
). 
 
Th e Express Proceedings Part 1
 With the pressure on them, the legislators were determined to take 
exceptional eff orts to avoid the FATF sanctions and to ensure the passage of 
the anti–money laundering law before the deadline. Th ey engaged in express 
and marathon proceedings by putting the status of the bill as of primordial 
importance, taking precedence over all other pending legislative proposals. After 
the committee hearings, both chambers on the th of September immediately 
sponsored in plenary and approved for second reading the committee report: 
Committee Report no.  on House Bill  for the House of Representatives 
and Committee Report no.  on Senate Bill  for the Senate. For its 
immediate enactment on the same day, the president certifi ed the committee 
reports of both chambers in line with constitutional provision article VI, section 
, paragraph , which states,
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed 
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its fi nal 
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, 
except when the President certifi es to the necessity of its immediate 
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. 
 In eff ect, the certifi cation dispensed with the three readings on separate 
days so that the second and third readings could be done on the same day. 
Accordingly, marathon proceedings on the second and third readings as well 
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as the bill’s approval were held simultaneously in the Senate and the House 
from September  to . Th e House held nonstop deliberations from : 
a.m. of September  to : a.m. of the following day. Senator Magsaysay 
remarked,
Th e Senate passed on third reading the Bill on Anti–money laundering this 
morning at : a.m. Th is is after almost  hours, nonstop. From Monday, 
the Senate spent  hours and  minutes to deliberate on one of the hardest 
legislations ever discussed by the Senate.
 On the side of the executive offi  cials, they “conspired” to quell any possible 
resistance in Congress to ensure that the FATF timetable in passing the law 
was met. Th e executive offi  cials that took part in the committee deliberations 
not only clearly stated the seriousness of the threat of the international 
body, but also made subtle eff orts to hasten and facilitate the process. Th ere 
was apparently a deliberate attempt on their part to withhold or selectively 
disseminate information and data requested by legislators opposed to the bill. 
For instance, to check the truthfulness of the “common theme” of executive 
offi  cials that the country would face “diffi  culties” in case the bill was not passed, 
Senator John Osmeña requested a catalog or detailed listing of all transactions 
in the banking sector that would experience diffi  culties or problems. To verify 
whether most countries have an anti–money laundering law, Senator Aquilino 
Pimentel requested the list of all countries in the world that passed or had an 
anti–money laundering law. He contended that “the Senate is being asked to 
enact a very important piece of legislation, and yet the executive department, 
particularly through the Finance Department and the Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas, do not even furnish us with the required data upon which to base 
our actuations.” On both occasions, the executive offi  cials promised to send the 
requested information to the legislators, but no information came. As observed 
by Senator Joker Arroyo, “I think that the government agenc[ies] concerned 
with this—[BSP, DOF, DOJ, DFA and AMLC]—ha[ve] not been candid 
and frank with Senator Magsaysay and his committee . . . In short, there are 
certain information that has either been withheld from him or not necessarily 
misinterpreted but misstated.” Th e action taken by the executive offi  cials made 
it very diffi  cult for dissenting legislators to thoroughly scrutinize and oppose 
the bill. As the deadline neared, it became futile and pointless for the opposing 
lawmakers to hinder the enactment of the anti–money laundering law.
 Another instance that patently shows the intent to enact the bill in time 
to meet the deadline was the shortcut taken on September  before the 
start of the second day of interpellations. Th e senators followed an unusual 
practice when Senator Magsaysay announced that  senators had agreed to 
simplify the proceedings by adopting a new report by substitution, which in 
eff ect replaced the committee report with the new working draft. Th is move, 
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according to Senator J. Osmeña, “is premature because we are still in the period 
of sponsorship and we cannot entertain amendments, even an amendment by 
substitution, until we close the period of sponsorship and we go to the period 
of amendments.” Moreover, he informed the body that “in parliamentary 
practice, if we were really to be strict, we would have to return that committee 
report to the committee and the committee would have to refer it back to the 
chamber.” 
 Immediately after the approval of the committee report, the Bicameral 
Conference Committee (BCC) convened and started its deliberations on the 
following day, September . Th e BCC took only a day—the deliberation 
started at eight-thirty in the morning and fi nished at ten o’clock at night. On 
the next day, September , straightaway within the day, the BCC Report 
was ratifi ed in both chambers, and the resulting law, Republic Act  or 
the Anti–Money Laundering Act was signed by the president in Malacañang 
Palace. Th us, after deliberations in record time of a little over a month, the 
AMLA was enacted a day before the September  FATF deadline.
Th e Express Proceedings Part 2
 In June , the FATF NCCT Report observed that R.A.  did not 
fully satisfy the FATF standards. Th e FATF indicated that some stipulations 
inserted in the law were inconsistent with the  +  Recommendations. Th e 
FATF noted,
. Although the Philippines’ authorities interpret the regulations as 
requiring the reporting of all suspicious transactions, this nevertheless 
confl icts with the AMLA, which only requires reporting of high threshold 
suspicious transactions. 
. Th e law allows the AMLC to access account information upon a court 
order, but a major loophole remains in that secrecy provisions still protect 
banking deposits made prior to  October . Secrecy provisions 
also still restrict bank supervisor’s access to account information (FATF-
GAFI, ).
 In particular, the objection seems to refer to section , paragraph b and 
b, and section  of R.A. :
 
Section , paragraph b. “Covered Transaction” is a single, series, or 
combination of transactions involving a total amount in excess of Four 
million Philippine pesos (Php,,.) or an equivalent amount 
in foreign currency based on the prevailing exchange rate within fi ve () 
consecutive banking days except those between a covered institution and a 
person who, at the time of the transaction was properly identifi ed client and 
the amount is commensurate with the business or fi nancial capacity of the 
client; or those with an underlying legal or trade obligation, purpose, origin 
or economic justifi cation.
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 It likewise refers to a single, series, or combination or pattern of unusually 
large and complex transactions in excess of Four million Philippine pesos 
(Php,,.) especially cash deposits and investments having no 
credible purpose or origin, underlying trade obligation or contract.
. . . . .
Section . Th e provisions of this Act shall not apply to deposits and 
investments made prior to its eff ectivity.
 Accordingly, Mr. Vicente Aquino, the executive director of the newly 
operating Anti–Money Laundering Council (AMLC), reported that the major 
concerns of the FATF were the following: fi rst, the threshold was too high 
and should be lowered to the equivalent of US$, or roughly P, 
in Philippine currency; second, although incorporated in the implementing 
rules and regulations, the suspicious transaction reporting requirement was 
not included in the law; third, the AMLC lacked the authority to inquire into 
or examine bank accounts or investments without the order of a competent 
court; and fourth, bank deposits and transactions prior to the eff ectivity of the 
law may be examined for the purpose of investigation and not for the purpose 
of prosecution.
 With these deficiencies, the FATF again called on the Philippine 
government to take the necessary steps to amend the AMLA so as to comply 
with the FATF standards. To ensure prompt action, the call of the FATF was 
accompanied by an advisory that the process of delisting from the NCCT 
would not commence and that the country might still face sanctions in case of 
noncompliance. Th e FATF warned,
FATF has taken the serious step of recommending that its members impose 
additional countermeasures against Philippines due to the failure of the 
Philippines to enact legislation to address previously identifi ed defi ciencies 
in their anti–money laundering regime. Th e FATF calls upon the Philippine 
Government to enact the appropriate legislative amendments by  March 
. Failure would lead to countermeasures to the Philippines as of that 
date (FATF-GAFI, c).
 Th e seriousness of the warning was echoed by Senator Magsaysay, the 
chairman of the Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions, and Currencies, 
on the opening of the committee hearings to amend R.A. :
Our law was enacted last September ,  as the Philippines’ response to 
the call of the Financial Action Task Force or FATF, to address the problem 
of money laundering activities all over the world. However, compared with 
the money laundering laws in other countries, RA  imposes a very 
high threshold level which the FATF believes is too high for reporting and 
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monitoring purposes. To this date, we remain in the list of non-cooperative 
countries and territories, NCCT, for failure of the Philippines to comply with 
the recommendations of the FATF, hence, the need to amend our present 
law so that countermeasures will not be imposed on our fi nancial system 
and jurisdiction in the assessments to be conducted by FATF this October, 
this year, in Paris.
 Th e move to amend AMLA began in the House of Representatives on  
September , when the Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries, 
Committee on Economic Aff airs, and Committee on Justice conducted a joint 
committee hearing for House Bill no.. In the Senate, the move commenced 
on  August , when the Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions, 
and Currencies and Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision 
of Codes and Laws conducted a joint committee hearing for Senate Bills no. 
, , and . Th e bills were fi led by Senators Panfi lo Lacson, Francis 
Pangilinan, and Sergio Osmeña, respectively. 
 Th e cudgel for amending the AMLA was taken up by the AMLC. After the 
face-to-face meeting between the Philippine delegation and the FATF, Executive 
Director Aquino reported to the committee hearings in both the Senate and 
House of Representatives that until the pertinent amendments in the AMLA are 
made, the FATF “would start imposing drastic sanctions and countermeasures 
against the Philippines.” As a concrete example of the consequences of sanctions, 
Mr. Aquino cited the case of the Republic of the Marshall Islands where the 
international banking community had imposed sanctions. “Right now, no 
inward and outward remittances could be made within the fi nancial system 
of this territory” as they “could only send out and receive through mail, but 
not through wire transfers.” Th e eff ect of sanctions, he warned, would be 
more severe in the case of the Philippines, considering that the economy was 
mainly dependent on the dollar remittances of OFWs. In addition, Mr. Aquino 
observed that since the Philippines had been chosen by the Asia Pacifi c Group 
(APG) on Money Laundering to host the  APG meeting, it would be a 
huge embarrassment for the Arroyo administration to host the said meeting 
while the country is on the dishonorable list of NCCTs.
 After the committee hearings in both chambers, the respective committee 
reports were sponsored in the plenary session on  November  in the 
Senate and  January  in the House of Representatives. As the bill was 
certifi ed as urgent by President Arroyo on  November , it was approved 
after the second and third readings on  February  in both chambers as 
Senate Bill no.  (Committee Report no. ) and as House Bill no.  
(Committee Report no. ). 
 For the consolidation of the Senate Bill and the House Bill, the BCC 
was convened on February  and given the February  deadline. Th e “new” 
deadline was supplied by Senator Magsaysay to the BCC members as the 
presumed deadline since the date coincided with the annual meeting of the 
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FATF. With this information, the BCC was able to come up with a Conference 
Committee Report close to midnight of February . Th is happened despite the 
presence of contentious provisions. For instance, Senator Magsaysay admitted 
that lowering the threshold and tampering with the Bank Secrecy Law will 
meet with a lot of resistance as “a lot of Congressmen and some Senators are 
going to fi ght this tooth and nail.” Both chambers subsequently approved the 
Conference Committee Report on the following day, February , .
 After the approval, however, there were immediate indications to the 
executive department and lawmakers that the approved BCC report would 
not be acceptable to the FATF. Th is development was substantiated by the 
February  letter of the president of the FATF, which identifi ed the concerns 
that the amendment needed to address, such as the expansion of the defi nition 
of “covered transaction” to include any suspicious transaction regardless of 
threshold amount; to make P, the threshold for reporting covered 
transactions; to broaden the defi nition of suspicious transactions; and to address 
the very high standard of diligence as well as the stringent penalties on bank 
offi  cers reporting suspicious transactions, which could discourage them from 
performing their duties diligently.
 With this apprehension, the ratifi cation of the approved BCC report in 
plenary in both chambers was put on hold. Th e concerns in the letter were made 
the basis for the Arroyo government’s request for direct discussions between the 
lawmakers ( senators and a number of congressmen) led by Senate President 
Franklin Drilon and the delegates of the FATF. At the meeting held on February 
, the lawmakers addressed the concerns of the FATF by suggesting proposals 
and submitting them to the delegates. To be certain that the proposals would 
be accepted, Senate President Drilon ensured that acceptance by the FATF 
delegates was not only verbal but also in writing.
 On February  in the Senate and February  in the House, on the basis 
of the “informal” agreement between the lawmakers and the FATF delegates, 
there was a move in both chambers for the reconsideration of the approved 
BCC Report. As a consequence, the BCC was reconstituted on March  to 
modify and incorporate the agreed-upon amendments to the AMLA. To ensure 
that the lawmakers would adhere to the agreement, Senate President Drilon, 
who was not even a member of the BCC, practically took over the meeting by 
presiding and directing the discussions. For instance, when some lawmakers 
proposed to add changes to the bill, the senate president warned that if the 
BCC went beyond the agreement, then they might be guilty of nonconformity 
and would risk being cited as noncompliant with international standards. In 
support, Senator Lacson stated that to avoid the risk of being branded by the 
international delegates as not honoring the agreement, they should just limit 
the discussions to what the senators and the FATF agreed on. Senator Angara 
cautioned that if they added one word or another, it may require another round 
of negotiation or consultation. Moreover, to add pressure, the senate president 
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informed the BCC members that to avoid countermeasures, they must enact 
the law before the March  FATF deadline. 
 On the next day, March , the reconstituted BCC Report was ratifi ed in 
both chambers, and the resulting law, Republic Act , was signed by the 
President on March , . Th us, Congress formally amended RA . As 
FATF reported,
[RA ] amends the AMLA and addresses the legal defi ciencies. It requires 
the reporting of all suspicious transactions, grants the BSP (the banking 
supervisor) full access to account information to examine for anti–money 
laundering compliance, and allows the AMLC to inquire into deposits and 
investments made prior to the AMLA coming into eff ect (a).
 As a corollary to the compliance, the FATF decided not to impose 
countermeasures on the Philippines (FATF-GAFI, b) but was quick to 
remind the Philippine government that with the passage of the appropriate law, 
the government must now adequately implement the anti–money laundering 
measures. Enforcement of the AMLA would be monitored by the FATF while 
its members evaluated the removal of the Philippines from the blacklist. 
 After almost two years of monitoring, the FATF removed the Philippines 
from the NCCT list in February . However, it continued to monitor the 
country for a period of time as part of its standard monitoring process for 
delisted countries to ensure continuous and proper implementation (FATF-
GAFI, ). After a year, in February , the FATF eventually decided to 
end its formal monitoring of the Philippines (FATF-GAFI, ).
International Organization and Veto Players
 The story of the making of AMLA is atypical. According to the 
policymaking process, there must be agreement among the institutional veto 
players in producing a policy. Dissent from one player is enough to block the 
enactment of the policy. In the case at hand, the institutional veto players, 
specifi cally the executive and legislative (i.e., the Senate and the House of 
Representatives) branches, were in agreement to push the AMLA; however, 
the swift action taken was made possible by virtue of an exogenous force that 
furnished incentives and bound the policy actors to cooperate.
 What made the enactment of AMLA diff erent was that it was based 
primarily on the demand of an international organization through an 
uncompromising time frame, the NCCT blacklist, and the threat of sanctions. 
As to the time frame, the FATF made it very clear from the beginning that its 
imposed deadlines— September  on the initial legislation and  March 
2010 © University of the Philippines Mindanao
63BRILLO | BANWA VOL. 7, NO. 1 (2010): 40–68
 on the call for amendments—were nonnegotiable. Th is determined stance 
was demonstrated on several occasions where the FATF declined the request 
of the Philippines for an extension of the deadline. As to the NCCT list, the 
processes of listing and delisting are unilateral undertakings of the FATF. As to 
the threat of sanctions, the FATF had warned they would impose additional 
countermeasures if the anti–money laundering law was not enacted before the 
deadline. Th e sanctions promised to be economically costly for the country.
 For the enactment of AMLA in the Philippines, it is evident that the agenda 
was set by the FATF. Th e initiative for the policy came from the FATF, an 
outsider and a nonveto player whose consent and participation, by convention, 
were not needed in the policymaking process. In the name of global standards, 
the eff ect of the FATF on the process was overwhelming. Th e FATF was able 
to ensure that the institutional veto players cooperated and worked together. 
As the veto players were driven more by the common intent to avoid sanctions 
than the belief in the signifi cance of such a policy, they made extraordinary 
eff orts to pass the AMLA in record time and before the prescribed deadline. 
Th e pressures brought about by the threat of sanctions made it possible for 
an international organization to have a profound infl uence over the domestic 
policymaking process, enabling a nonveto player, like the FATF, to dictate to 
the institutional veto players and to shape the policy outcome. Th us, after 
years of apathy and lackluster eff orts to enact an anti–money laundering law 
in Congress, it was only the demand by the FATF that set the ball rolling, so 
to speak.
 Th e strategy that the FATF utilized to compel the veto players to conform 
was to make it appear that the undertaking was voluntary on the part of each 
sovereign country. Th e FATF argued that, generally, countries recognized that 
adopting the  +  Recommendations was important for the protection and 
soundness of their own fi nancial system (FATF-GAFI, b). In practice, 
however, the sustained pressure applied by the FATF to the policymaking process 
that made noncompliance very costly made the undertaking mandatory rather 
than voluntary. Th e mandatory nature of the FATF standard and the potency of 
its sanctions can be seen in the swift compliance by all countries that had been 
listed as NCCTs. All the  blacklisted countries responded rapidly to embrace 
the designated global regulatory standard. McDonnell, the current executive 
secretary of the FATF, stated that the FATF standard has now been adopted by 
 countries, representing more than  of the world (FATF-GAFI, a). 
Th e overall pattern is similar to the Philippine experience, as initially the NCCTs 
did not make a serious eff ort to push an anti–money laundering law. Only 
after they were blacklisted and threatened with countermeasures did they make 
a resolute eff ort to have one. Th e comportment of the countries manifested 
the notion that had it not been for the fear of sanctions, the law would not 
have materialized. Furthermore, the pattern leads to an asymmetrical relation, 
where the international organization can “penalize” while the countries cannot 
2010 © University of the Philippines Mindanao
64 BRILLO | BANWA VOL. 7, NO. 1 (2010): 40–68
hold it accountable, nor have they the power to correspondingly sanction the 
organization.
 Th e infl uence exerted by the FATF over the veto players is amplifi ed 
considerably by its alliance with other international organizations, in particular 
the IFIs. Th e FATF has underscored that in the performance of its activities, it 
will collaborate with other international bodies involved in combating money 
laundering and the fi nancing of terrorism. For instance, it has acknowledged 
the important contribution made by the IMF and the WB in the eff orts to 
implement the AML/CFT regime in non-FATF member countries (FATF-
GAFI, b). The global cooperation implies that these international 
institutions will give the necessary support to ensure compliance with the global 
standard so that the FATF can count not only on its member countries but 
also on infl uential international institutions to recognize and support FATF’s 
actions against a noncomplying state. For the veto players, that relationship 
translates into enormous pressure as they recognized the backlash that could 
ensue, given that the Philippines has robust political and economic ties with 
most FATF-member countries as well as with the IFIs.
Conclusion
 Th e dynamics between the international organization and the institutional 
actors vis-à-vis the policymaking process that enacted AMLA is asymmetrical. 
Th e law was mainly exogenously driven—instigated by external demand and 
enacted under the threat of sanctions. AMLA is deemed an imposition of 
the FATF. Th e swiftness of its enactment exemplifi es the immense infl uence 
an international organization can have on the policy actors as well as the 
policymaking process. Th e Philippines, after being blacklisted and threatened 
with countermeasures in the name of global standards, made extraordinary 
eff orts to comply with the FATF standards by enacting AMLA. Th e eff orts 
included prioritizing the bill, changing the executive offi  cials and legislators from 
being disinterested to being committed policy actors, accelerating the formal 
policymaking process, and manipulating the BCC. In addition, when the FATF 
claimed that the enacted law did not meet the FATF standard, the policy actors 
promptly took action to amend the law. Th e compliance of the institutional 
veto players manifests the inexorable infl uence a nonveto player can have in the 
policymaking process and output. Typically, this is a case of an international 
organization defi ning the process and determining the outcome.
 Th e policymaking process in this type of institutional interaction—between 
institutional actors within a polity and an international organization—though 
effi  cient in producing policies represents an issue of international override, where 
a nonveto player dictates to the institutional veto players and determines policy. 
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Th e experience in the making of AMLA is an archetype of the global pattern 
that, on issues associated with international fi nancial standards, policymaking 
will less be shaped by the institutional actors and will be extensively defi ned 
by international institutions. Th e quest to put up universal standards has 
given international organizations the opportunity to “penetrate” the domestic 
policymaking process. 
Notes
. Information on FATF is obtained mainly from their offi  cial Web site: www 
.fatf-gafi .org.
. FATF has  member jurisdiction (i.e., Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kingdom of 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States) and 
two regional organizations (i.e., the European Commission and Gulf Co-
operation Council).
. AML/CFT Methodology  is available here: http://www.fatf-gafi .org/
dataoecd///.pdf.
. Available at http://www.fatf-gafi .org/dataoecd///.pdf.
. FSRBs/FATF associate members: the Asia Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG), Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the 
Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti–money 
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), 
the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America 
(GAFISUD), and the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task 
Force (MENAFATF). FSRBs: the Eurasian Group (EAG), the Eastern 
and Southern Africa Anti–Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), and 
the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money-Laundering in Africa 
(GIABA).
. Complete and detailed List of Criteria for Defi ning Non-Cooperative 
Countries or Territories (NCCTs) is available at http://www.fatf-gafi .org/
dataoecd///.pdf (see Annex ).
. In , the following countries/territories have undergone NCCT 
assessment: Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, 
Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, 
Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. In , 
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the following countries/territories: Egypt, Grenada, Guatemala, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Ukraine. No additional countries have 
been reviewed since .
. Th e complete steps for delisting are available at http://www.fatf-gafi .org/
dataoecd///.pdf (see Annex ).
. President Arroyo’s speech during the signing of AMLA available at http://
www.ops.gov.ph/opnet/speech-sept.htm.
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